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Abstract 
A decision maker is seen to be coherent in the sense of de Finetti if, 
and only if, his probabilities are computed in accordance with some finitely 
additive prior. If a bounded loss function is specified, then a decision 
rule is extended admissible (i.e. not uniformly dominated) if, and only if, 
it is Bayes for some finitely additive prior. However, if an improper, 
countably additive prior is used, then decisions need not cohere and 
decision rules need not be extended admissible. Invariant, finitely addi-
tive priors are found and their posteriors calculated for a class of prob-
lems which include translation parameter problems. 
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o. Introduction. The main object of this note is to present a simple formula-
tion of statistical decision problems using finitely additive probabilities as 
has been recommended by Bruno de Finetti [7] and Leonard J. Savage [13]. One diffi-
culty is that the theory of conditional distributions for finitely additive proba-
bilities is relatively new and still incomplete. (Some major results are in 
Lester Dubins' paper [4].) Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize coherent 
conditional odds functions as being the posteriors of finitely additive priors, 
a result which was proved by Freedman and Purves [8] for finite spaces. There 
is probably an interesting extension of their theorem in a countably additive 
setting as well, but we suspect that such-a result would be more difficult than 
Theorem 1 and its corollary. Theorem 1 is proved by a simple separation argu-
ment and the same type of argument also yields a characterization of the extended 
admissible decision rules as being just the Bayes rules, at least in the case of 
a bounded loss function (Theorem 2). The computation of the Bayes rule for a 
given finitely additive prior typically requires its posterior and Theorem 3 
enables one to find the posterior for a natural prior in a class of generalized 
translation parameter problems including the Behrens-Fisher problem. The 
final section treats briefly the relationship of improper, countably additive 
priors to the finitely additive theory. Many of the improper priors which are 
commonly employed lead to posteriors which could have been reached from a proper, 
finitely additive prior. However, this is not the case for every improper prior 
and such priors can result in incoherence and uniformly inadmissible decision 
rules (Example 5.2). 
·• 
.. 
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1. Preliminaries. Let S be a nonempty set. A probability rr on S here· 
means a finitely additive probability measure defined on all subsets of S. 
Denote by P(s) the collection of all probabilities on S and by L(s) the 
space of all bounded, real-valued functions with domain s. To each rr in 
P(s) corresponds a unique nonnegative linear functional t on L(S) such that 
(1.1) 
for all ES s. Furthermore, every nonnegative linear functional t on L(S) 
such that 1(18) = 1 determines a rr in P(s) by (1.1). Henceforth, such an 
t is identified with the corresponding rr and, as suggested by de Finetti, the 
indicator function lE is identified with the set E. The value of rr at a 
function f will be written rr(f), j f drr, or J f(s)rr(ds). 
The following lemma is a slight improvement of Theorem 1 in [10], 
and the proof is almost the same. 
Lemma 1. ~ F5L(S). ~ (i) there exists!. rr in 
-
P(S) 
rr(f) 2: 0 £2E !.!! f e F g, ,2 only if, (ii) every finite, convex combination 
.2!_ functions in F has!. nonnegative supremum. 
Proof: Because rr is a nonnegative linear functional, it is trivial that (i) 
implies (ii). Now assume (ii) and give L(S) the sup norm topology. Let C 
be the set of all functions of the form a1f 1 + ••• + anfn where 
fie F for all i. Define N = {f e L(s): sup f < o}. Then C 
a. > 0 and 
l. -
and N are 
convex sets which are disjoint by (ii). Furthermore, the interior of N is 
nonempty since it contains, for exanple, the function f = -1. By a standard 
s·eparation theorem ( [ 6], p. 417), there is a nontrivial, continuous linear 
functional t and a real number r such that t(f) ~ r on C and 
t(f) ,5 r on N. Because O is a limit point of both C and N and t is 
continuous, the constant r must equal O. Thus t is a nonnegative functional 
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and the rr if (i) can be taken to be -1 a t where a= t(l). 
A rr in P(S) can be extended to functions f on S, which are 
bounded below, by taking the inner integral thus. 
(1.2) rr(f) = sup rr(f An). 
n 
Here f An is the minimum of f with n and n ranges over the set of 
natural numbers. 
D 
... 
·. 
- . 
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2. Coherence ~ .! theorem of Freedman ~ Purves. Let X and ® be 
nonempty sets to be thought of as the set of possible observations and possible 
states of nature respectively. Let p be a conditional probability~ ® 
given X, that is, a mapping from ® into P(X). For e e ® and B sx, 
p(e){B) will sometimes be written p
8
(B) or p(B(e). Consider, informally 
at first, a game with three participants known as the bookie, the gambler, 
and the master of ceremonies (MC). The MC selects e e ® and then, using 
the probability p(e), selects x e X. Next the MC reveals x to the 
bookie and the gambler. Then the bookie posts odds on subsets of ®, after 
which the gambler places a finite number of bets. Finally, the MC reveals 
e and the bookie and the gambler settle up. As shown by Freedman and Purves 
in [8] for the case when ® and X are finite, the bookie must post odds 
consistent with some posterior distribution or else the gambler can attain 
positive expected winnings for all values of e. The object of this section 
is to extend their result to infinite sets. 
It is convenient, for later applications, to equip ® and X with 
a-fields s1 = B(®) and s2 = B(X) of subsets. A conditional odds function 
------
q is a mapping from XX a1 to the unit interval. The interpretation is 
that, after observing x e X, the bookie posts the odds q(x, B): 1 - q(x, B) 
on sets A simple betting system is a pair (A, b) where 
and b is a bounded, real-valued, s2-measurable function on X. Here the 
interpretation is that, after observing x, the gambler stakes b(x)q(x, Ax) 
on the event Ax= {e:(e, x) e A}. The payoff from the bookie to the gambler is 
~(e, x) = b(x)[A(e, x) - q(x, Ax)] 
and the expected payoff, for a given e, is 
E(e) = J~(e, x) p(dx(e). 
In an unconditional setting ([7], p. 87), de Finetti has defined coherence to be 
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the absence of a combination of bets which results in a uniformly positive 
loss. Similarly, in this note an odds function q is called coherent if 
there does not exist a finite number of simple betting systems 
with associated expected payoffs 
that 
(2.1) inf{E1{e) + ••• + En{e)J > O. 
e 
••• , E 
n 
such 
This definition could be modified by allowing infinitely many bets or by 
weakening the requirement of uniform positivity in (2.1). Buehler [3] has 
also explored "preference-reversal" coherence, a notion of coherence formulated 
without betting. 
An element rr of P(®) is called a prior. Each prior rr together with 
the conditional probability p determines a marginal me P(X) by the formula 
(2.2) m(B) =JP(Ble)rr(de) 
for BS X. 
Theorem 1. ! conditional ~ function q is coherent g, ,!!!.2. only g, there 
!!, !. prior rr such that,~ every simple betting system (A, b), 
(2.3) fJb(x)A(e, x) p(dx(e)rr{de) = [b(x)q{x, Ax)m(dx),' 
where m is ~ marginal .2!. err, p) .2!!. x. 
Proof: Apply Lemma 1 with S = ® and F the collection of all functions 
E(e) which are expected payoff functions of a simple betting system. Use 
the fact that F is closed under multiplication by a real constant and also 
use the definition of m. D 
A conditional odds function q can be regarded as a conditional proba-
bility on ® given X if, for each x, q(•lx) = q{x, ·~) is an element of P(®). 
.... 
.... 
... 
.... 
. '-
·. 
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There is good reason for the bookie to select an odds function q which is 
a conditional probability since otherwise, for those x· at which q(x, •) 
is not in P(®), the gambler can inflict a sure loss ([10], Theorem 5). 
A posterior~.! prior rr (relative E.2, Bi X 92) is a conditional 
probability q on ® given X such that for all bounded, real-valued, 
s1 X s2-measurable functicns q, on ® x X, 
(2.4) ss~ce, x)p(dxfe)rr{de) =J!~(e, x)q(de(x)m{dx), 
where m is the marginal of (rr, p) on x. 
Corollary 1. ! conditional probability q on ® given X !!_ coherent !f, 
~ only g, iE, ,!!. .! posterior ~ !2!!!.! prior 1T. 
The corollary is not as satisfactory·as it may seem. For as Lester 
Dubins [4] has shown, not every prior has a posterior. Thus a question 
implicit in the corollary and of some independent interest is for which 
priors do posteriors exist. A special case is treated in Section 4. 
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3. Decision problems~ extended admissibility. To formulate an abstract 
statistical decision problem, introduce, in addition to the sets X, ® and 
conditional probability p, a nonempty action set A and a loss function 
- - ----
L which maps ® X A to the nonnegative reals. A (randomized) decision~ 
6 is a conditional probability on A given X. The E.!!.! r(o) of a 
decision rule 6 is defined by 
(3.1) r{o){e) = r{e, a) 
= JL'{e, 6(x))p(dx(e), 
where 
L'(e, v) = fL(e, a)y(da) 
for e e ®, x e X, ye P(A). A mapping f from X to A is a pure decision 
~- Such an f can also be regarded as a randomized rule if, for each x, 
f(x) is identified with that element of P(A) which assigns probability one 
to {f(x)}. 
Notions of admissibility will be formulated relative to a fixed collection 
D of decision rules and elements of D will be called D-rules. D can be 
thought of, at present, as the collection of all decision rules, but, in some 
applications to come, it will be taken to be the set of decision rules which 
are measurable in an appropriate sense. As usual, a D-rule 6 is admissible 
0 
if there does not exist a D-rule 6 such that 
r(e, &) ~ r(e, 60 ) 
for all e with strict inequality holding for some e. Call 
if there does not exist a D-rule 6 for which 
6 e-admissible 
0 
for all e. As in Blackwell and Girshick [2], 6 is extended admissible if it 0 
... 
.. 
-
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is e-admissible for every e > O. As is easily seen, 6
0 
is extended 
admissible if, and only if, 
inf sup[r(e, 6) - r(e, 6 )] > O. 
6 e O -
Obviously, every admissible rule is extended admissible. However, the converse 
is false, as Example 4.1 (or a simpler example) shows. 
A decision rule 6
0 
is Bayes for a prior rr if 
for all decision rules o. 
Theorem 2. Every Bayes~!!. extended admissible. If the loss function L is 
---
bounded, ~ E.h,! ~ D !!, convex, ~ every extended admissible ~ ,!!. Bayes. 
Proof: The first assertion is a trivial consequence of the definitions. To 
prove the second, suppose 6 is extended admissible. 
0 
Set S = ® and take F 
to be the collection of all functions r(o) - r(o
0
), where a is a decision 
rule. The collection D is convex by hypothesis and, consequently, so is F 
because 
p1r(&1)+ ••• +p r(6) = r(p1&1+ ••• +p 6) . n n nn 
for pi~ 0, p1+ ••• +pn = 1. By (3.3), Lemma l(ii) and, hence, (i) hold. 
Obviously, 6 is Bayes for the rr of Lemma l(i). D 
0 
The remainder of this section is devoted to the problem of calculating a 
Bayes rule for a given prior. The conventional solution begins with the 
calculation of the posterior distribution. As already mentioned, a posterior 
need not exist in the general finitely additive setting. However, if there is 
a posterior, the Bayes rule can be calculated in the usual fashion by minimi-
zing posterior loss. 
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Two cases will be considered. Until the completion of Lemma 3.l below, 
take D to be the set of all decision rules. Measurability restrictions will 
be imposed later. A posterior q for a prior rr is complete if (2.4) holds 
for all bounded, real-valued functions ~ on ® x X. 
Lemma 3.1. Let q ~.!complete posterior !2!, ~ prior rr ~ suppose 
~, !2!, ~ x e X, ~ infimum 
inffJL'(e, y)q(delx): ye P(A)} 
is achieved at y = 6 (x). Then, if L _is bounded, 
0 - -
6
0 
is Bayes~ rr. 
Proof: Let m be the marginal for (rr, p) and let 6 be a decision rule. 
Then rr(r,6
0
)) = JJL'(e, 6
0
(x))p(dx(e)rr(de) 
= JJL'(e, o0 (x))q(de(x)m(dx) 
~fJL'(e, a(x))q(de(x)m(dx) 
= JfL'(e, o(x))p(dxfe)rr(de) 
= rr(r(6)). 
Assume from now until the end of Lemma 3.3 that ®, X, and A are 
equipped with these cr-fields of their subsets: B 1 = d( ®), B2 = B (x), and 
B
3 
= B(A). Let C(A) be the collection of those probabilities y in P(A) 
which are countably additive when restricted to B3 and identify each such 
v with its restriction to ira.3• There is a natural cr-field ~ of subsets 
of C(A); namely, L) is the least cr-field such that, for every E e B3, 
the mapping y ~ y(E) is measurable from C(A) to the unit interval equipped 
with its usual Borel sets. (This measurable structure on C(A) was explored 
by Dubins and Freedman [5].) Take D to be the set of decision rules 8 
which are measurable maps from X into C(A). In more coonnon parlance, D is 
.... 
D 
I 
6-1 
.... 
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the collection of regular conditional probabilities on A given X. Assume 
also that p is a regular conditional probability on X given ® and that 
L' is Bi X s3-measurable. A decision problem is called measurable if all the 
assumptions of this paragraph hold. 
Lemma 3.2. ~.!measurable.decision problem, El!:! function (e, x) ~ L'(e, 6(x)) 
!!_ B 1 X s2-measurabl~ ~ every D-~ 6. 
Proof: Almost immediate from the definition of L' in (3.2) and the Lemma in· 
Section 5 of [15]. 
Lemma 3.3. ~ q !?_! !. posterior ~ Tf relative !2, B1 x B2 ~ ~ 60 
~ .! D-rule. Then each £f El!:! following conditions implies !E.!_ successor. 
(a) For every x e X, 
(b) For every x e X, 
= inf JL(e; a)q(del x). 
aeA 
JL'(e, & (x))q(delx) = inf fL'(e, y)q(delx). 
- o yeC(A) 
(c) .!£. L ,!!. bounded, ~ 6
0 
!!, Bayes ~ TI'. 
Proof: To see that (a) implies (b), calculate as follows: 
JL'(e, y)q(defx) =JJL(e, a)y(da)q(defx) 
=jjL(e, a)q(delx)y(da) 
~JJL'(e, o0 (x))q(delx)y(da) 
= JL'(e, 6 (x))q(defx). 
- 0 
D 
Here the successive lines are by {3.2), by Fubini's theorem, by (a), and obvious, 
respectively. 
The proof that (b) implies (c) is a calculation like the one used in the 
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proof of Lemma 3.l, but it relies on Lemma 3.2 for the measurability of L'. 
Most of the results presented so far require that L be bounded. The 
following lemma treats a general nonnegative loss function, and, while the 
result is far from satisfactory, it does find application in Example 4.1. 
Lemma 3.4. Let 60 ~ .! D·E:.!!: which!! Bayes !£!: !h!, prior TT ~ !h!, 
loss function !!. Ln = L A. n !£!: every n = 1, 2, • • • • Suppose also ~ 
where r is the risk function corresponding 
n - - - ---- --------
to Ln. Then 6
0 
is Bayes!£!: rr !!!, !h!, original decision problem. 
Proof: Let 6 be a D-rule and calculate thus. 
rr(r(o)) > TT(r (5)) > TT(r (o )) -+TT(r(o )). 
- n - n o o 
The first inequality is obvious. The second inequality and the convergence 
are by hypothesis. 
0 
... 
0 
.. 
.. 
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4. Posteriors for translation families. The problem considered in this section 
is the existence and calculation of the posterior for a (generalized) transla-
tion family of distributions when the prior is invariant in an appropriate 
sense. Assume throughout this section that ® is a locally compact topological 
group and that X = ®· Suppose also that ® is amenable in the sense that there 
exists a finitely additively, left-invariant probability on the Borel subsets 
B of ®· The following condition is equivalent to amenability ([9], Theorem 
3.6.2) and also proves useful in calculations. Let h be the left Haar 
measure on B. 
Follner 's Condition. For every e > 0 and every compact set K S ®, 
there is a Borel set US® with O < h(U) < ~ and 
(4.1) 1h<~wfl1 < e 
for all e e K.(Here A a B = (A - B)U(B - A).) 
Using Follner's Condition, one can find a left-invariant mean rr as follows: 
Consider the collection {(e, K): e > 0, KS®, K compact} which is directed 
under the relation '<' where (el, Ki)~ (e2, K2) ¢>el:::; e2 and Ki S K2. 
For each (e, K), let u(e, K) satisfy (4.1) and define 
(4.2) rr(e, K)(B) = 
h(U{e, K}nB) 
h{U(e, K)) , 
for every B e 18.. Then (rr ( e, K) } is a net in the space 18. [O, 1] , and this 
space is compact when given the product topology. Consequently, there is a 
subnet {rr} (with corresponding sets u ) which converges to an element rr a a 
of [O, 1]8 • Ih other words, rr (B) -+ Tf(B) 
a 
for every B e B, and, hence, 
Sf drr -+ Jf drr for all bounded, di-measurable f. It follows easily that rr a . 
is finitely additive and left-invariant. Throughout this section, this rr 
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will be used as a prior. (As pointed out in [9], there are often many such 
left-invariant means rr. Anyone of them will do in what follows.) 
If a fixed element Pe of P(X) is "translated" by elements of the group 
X = 9, then it generates a conditional probability p on X given 9 which 
is defined by 
for bounded, a-measurable functions f. Here e is the identity element of 
the group. _Such a conditional probability p is called a translation family. 
(By taking X to be real n-dimensional space considered as an additive group, 
one sees that the present definition does include the traditional translation 
families of distributions. Additional examples are given below.) 
An element a of P(X) is tight if a(B) = sup{a(K):K SB, K compact} 
for every Be B. A tight probability a is easily seen to be countably 
additive ([1], Exercise 7, p. 11) and, conversely, if X is complete and 
separable, then every countably additive 
A translation family p is tight if p 
- e 
a is tight ([1], Theorem 1.4). 
(and, hence, each p
8
) is tight. 
Theorem 3. Suppose~ p !!, !. tight translation family. ~,under~ 
~-invariant prior rr, !. posterior!!,~ tight translation family q 
where 
(4.4) ff(e)q (de) =ff{e-1 )p (de) 
_ e e 
£2!: every bounded, a-measurable function f on e. 
Proof: Let cp be a bounded, B x IB-measurable function on 9 X X. The first 
step of the proof is to establish the following equality: 
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To verify (4.5), calculate thus. (Recall that sets are identified with their 
indicator functions.) 
(4.6) IS [~(e, xe) - ~(x-1e, e)]h(de)I = IS ~(x-1e, e)h(de) - J ~(x-1e, e)h{de)I 
U xU U 
a a a 
=fJ'~(x-1e, e)[(xU ){e)-U (e)]h{de)I 
a a 
=ll~llh(xU au), a a 
where \lcp\l = sup{l~(e, x) f: (e, x) e ® Xx}. 
Formula (4.5) now follows easily from (4.1) and the tightness of 
Next calculate again. 
= lim h(ii;;> vq,(e, xe)pe(dx)h(de) 
a a 
= lim h(ii) rrcp(xe, e)qe{dx)h(de) 
a a 'tf 
a 
p • 
e 
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= lim h(ii ) Jrcp(x, e)qe(dx)h(de) 
a a if 
Cl 
The succ.essive lines in (4.7) are, respectively, by (4.3), definition of TT, 
Fubini 1s theorem for the countably additive measures pe and h, (4.6), 
Fubini again, (4.4), definition of a translation family, definition of TT 
again, and obvious. 
Let Be B and take q> to be the indicator function of ® x B. Then 
(4.7) becomes 
and, hence, TT is the marginal on X. Consequently, it follows from (4.7) 
that q is a posterior. 
p is. 
e 
It is easy to verify that q is tight because 
e 
CJ 
Corollary 2. ,ll p .!!.! tight translation family,~~ translation family 
q defined !?I, (4.4) !!_.!coherent conditional probability. 
Proof: Use Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 of Section 2. 
In the following examples, s is an X-valued random variable with dis-
tribution p. By (4.4), q is the distribution of s·l. It follows from 
e e 
(4.3) that p is the distribution of se and likewise that qx is the dis-
e 
-1 tribution of s x for every e and x. 
Example 4.1. Let X = ®=Rn and regard Rn as an additive group. That Rn 
is amenable is well-known and easy to check with the aid of Follner's condition. 
Let p be a countably additive probability on B, Think of p as the dis-
e e 
.... 
.. 
-
-
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tribution of an n-dimensional random variable s• Then p is the distri-
e 
bution of S + e, is the distribution of 
of 
-s + x. Suppose now that is symmetric. 
and 
Then 
the distribution 
For a 
specific example, take s to be N{O, I); that is, normal with mean zero 
and covariance the identity matrix. Then, by the above, the posterior dis-
tribution given x, is N(x, I) and this posterior is, by Corollary 2, 
coherent. For this same example, consider the usual estimation problem with 
A= Rn and L{e, a)= He - all2 • It is easy to see, with the aid of Lemmas 
3.3 and 3.4, that the Bayes rule for the invariate prior rr is 6(x) = x, 
and so, by Theorem 2, 5 is weakly admissible. This 5 has a constant risk 
function and its weak admissibility is thus equivalent, as follows from (3,3), 
to its being minimax. That 6 is minimax follows also from a general theorem 
of Kiefer [11]. Finally, 6 is not admissible for n ~ 3 as was shown by 
Stein [14]. 
Example 4.2. This example treats the problem of inference from a univariate 
normal distribution with unknown mean and variance. To formulate the problem 
in the setting of this section, it is convenient to regard an observation of a 
random sample as being an observation of the sufficient statistics, namely, 
the sample mean and variance. Formally, let X = ® = ((µ,, a2): µ e R', a2 > OJ. 
The group operation is that of the affine group in one dimension: 
(µ., a2)~( v, ,-2) = ( rrµ + "' (arr)2 ). 
In essence, (µ., a2) is identified with the mapping x ~ax+~ and the operation 
is composition of functions. Notice that The amena-
bility of this group is shown in ( [9], pp. 68-69). 
Let Y1 , ••• , Yn be independent, N{O, 1) variables and let (Y, s2 ) be the 
sample mean and variance. Take Pe to be the distribution of S = (Y, s2 ). 
Then, for e = (~, a2), 
-17-
P is the distribution of the sample mean and variance e 
of a sample of size n from a N(µ, cf) variable. Furthermore, qe is the 
S-2 ). Set T = -Ys-1 • <Jn=i,T has a Student t distribution of -1 I; 
distribution.) Then the posterior distribution of c~, a2) given X = G, s2 ) 
is which is the distribution of 
In particular, the posterior distribution of µ is specified by the fact that 
( -) -1 ~ - y ~ has the same distribution as T. 
Example 4. 3. Consider now independent sanples from two normal populations each 
with unknown means and variances. The notation of the previous example will be 
used with subscripts 1 and 2 to indicate the two populations. In particular, _, 
x1 and x2 are taken to be the group of the previous example and the X of 
this example is taken to be the direct product of x1 with x2• 
= ( ,;; 2) Iv 2) ) -1 ( ( -2) ( -1) ) ~ \Y1 , s1 , \Y2 , s2 • Then ~ = T1 , s1 , T2 , s2 
x = ((y1 , s1), (y2 , s~)), ~ is the distribution of 
Let 
and, for 
In particular, the posterior distribution of the difference of the two means is 
that of s1T1 + Yi - s2T2 - Y2 • 
The coherence of the posterior distributions of the last two examples 
.... 
is closely related to the fact that, if these distributions are used to calculate 111111 
confidence intervals for the mean and difference of the means, respectively, 
then there exists "no negatively biased relevant selection" as was shown by 
Robins on [ 12 ] • 
I 
.... 
--
-18-
5. Improper priors_£!!! result~ incoherent posteriors~ uniformly 
inadmissible decision rules. The object of this section is to begin an 
exploration of the relation of finitely additive priors to improper priors. 
By an improper prior is meant, as usual, a countably additive measure v 
on B(®) such that v(®) is infinite. To avoid unnecessary technicalities, 
assume throughout this section that X, ®, and A are Borel subsets of 
some Euclidean space and are equipped with their usual Borel fields of 
subsets. By a density is here meant a density with respect to Lebesgue 
measure. Suppose that each of the measures p has a density 8 
X and that v has a density g(e) on ®· Define 
(5.1) h(e(x) = f(xle)g(e) 
Jf(x(t)g(t)dt 
® 
f(xle) on 
whenever the denominator is finite and not zero. By a posterior for v is 
meant a regular conditional probability q on ® given X such that, for 
each e, q{•lx) has a density h{e(x). If v were a proper, countably 
additive prior, then Bayes formula (5.1) would, in fact, define the density 
of its posterior. In the improper case, (5.l) is often used as a formal 
device without theoretical foundation. Nevertheless, it sometimes leads to 
a genuine posterior which could also have been obtained from a proper, 
finitely additive prior. 
!xample 5.1. n Let X = ® = R and suppose p8 is a normal distribution with 
mean e and covariance the identity matrix. Let v be Lebesgue measure on 
Rn. Then (5.1) yields the same posterior as that obtained from an invariant 
finitely additive prior as in Example 4.1. {The normal distribution is not 
essential here and any translation family would work equally·well.) 
-19-
However, as the next example illustrates, the use of (5.1) with an 
improper prior can result in an incoherent posterior. 
Example 5.2. Let + S=X=R, the set of strictly positive real numbers. For 
every e, let p be the uniform distribution on the interval [e/2, 3e/2] so 
e 
that p has the density 
e 
f(x(e) -1 = e for e/2 S x S 3e/2, 
= 0 elsewhere. 
Let v be Lebesgue measure on ® so that g{e) = 1 for all e. Then (5.1) 
leads to a posterior q with density 
(5.2) g(e(x) = (e log 3)-l for 2x/3 Se S 2x, 
=0 elsewhere, 
for every x. 
Consider the simple betting system A, b where b = 1 and A= 
((e, x):e ~ x S 3e/2J. Then, for every x, Ax= (e:2x/3 Se S x} and 
1 Jx ! de= q(Axlx) = ,~h? 2x/3 e 
The corresponding expected loss is 
log 3 - log 2 
log 3 
E{e) = J[A{e, x) - q{Ax(x)] p(dx(e) 
= 1/2 - log 3 - log 2 
log 3 
> o. 
Hence, q is incoherent. 
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Improper priors are also used to calculate decision rules. In fact, the 
Bayes rule for an improper prior is taken to be that rule which minimizes 
the expected posterior loss if such a rule exists. Example 5.2 can be used 
to show that the Bayes rule for an improper prior need not be extended admissible 
even for a measurable decision problem with a bounded loss function. 
Example 5.2. (continued). In addition to the structure already specified, 
introduce A =R+ and L{e, a)= min{a-1)e - a), 3}. 
To compute the Bayes rule f for the improper prior v, it suffices to 
find, for each x, that action a= f(x) which minimizes JL{e, a)g(efx)dx, 
where g is given by (5.2). Since the density g(•)x) is concentrated on the 
interval I(x) = [2x/3, 2x], it is clear that a must lie in I(x) and it 
follows that e Sa S 3e and, hence, L(e, a)= a-1)e - a)~ 3. Thus a must 
minimize 
a 2x 
Ja-1 le-alg{elx)dx =J {1-e/a) 8 i!g 3 de+ J (e/a - 1) 8 i!g 3 de. 2x/3 a 
By differentiating, one can see that a= 4x/2, the midpoint of I(x). 
. () -1 Consider now any decision rule of the form fa X = a X where 
2/3 S a·l S 2 so that f(x) e I(x) for each x. Then its risk is 
3e/2 
r{e, fQ) = J ax-1 le - a-1x1e-1dx 
~ e/2 
= 2~[(log(2/A/'3')- 1) + log al+ 1}. 
The risk does not depend on e, but only on the constant a. The unique 
a which minimizes r(e, fa) is easily seen to be a = 2//3. Every other 
0 
fa, including the Bayes rule for v which is £413 , is uniformly dominated 
-21-
by fa and, therefore, is not extended admissible. 
0 
An obvious problem, which is suggested by Example 5.2, is to determine 
which improper priors do lead to coherent posteriors and extended admissible 
decision rules. This problem is, in view of Corollary 1 and Theorem 2, 
almost the same as that of finding those improper priors whose posteriors 
could also be obtained from proper, finitely additive priors. 
... 
... 
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